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This paper investigates the effectiveness of fiscal policy in five Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.  
Through a structural vector autoregression (VAR) model, government spending is found 
to have weak and largely insignificant impact on output, while taxes are found to have 
outcomes contrary to conventional theory. Extensions using a time-varying VAR model 
reveal  the  impact  of  taxes  on  output  mainly  reflect  heightened  concerns  over  public 
finances amid the Asian financial crisis and the recent global financial crisis. On the 
other hand, for Singapore and Thailand, there is evidence that government spending can 
at times be useful as a tool for countercyclical policy.     
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1.   Introduction 
 
The flurry of fiscal stimulus packages implemented in the last few years  both in the 
developed  countries  and  developing  countries  in  response  to  the  sharp  economic 
slowdown  seem  to  suggest  that  there  is  unequivocal  support  for  fiscal  policy  in 
stabilizing economic fluctuations. The reality is quite the opposite. A debate hosted by 
The  Economist  amid  the  global  recession  in  early  2009  on  whether  ―Keynesian 
principles‖ should dominate policymaking of the day ended with a vote of 63% against 
the  motion.
1 Meanwhile, the massive $814   billion US government stimulus has not 
produced the desired outcomes .
2 The pace of recover y from the  country‘s  sharpest 
recession since World War II has not only been weak, but is also losing momentum. 
More disturbingly, the unemployment rate has remained stubbornly high above 9% since 
early 2009. In Europe, where governments generally take a more active approach to 
macroeconomic  management,  the  voice,  including  financial  markets,  to  wind  back 
stimulative measures and to change the spendthrift habits of the last decades has grown 
louder. Fiscal consolidations are now touted as key to pave the way for future economic 
growth (Trichet 2010, and Alesina and Ardagna 2009).  
 
In developing Asia, on the other hand, there has largely been an absence of the debate 
on the efficacy of fiscal stimulus. The fact that the region has recovered much faster than 
the rest of the world seems to suggest that the stimulative policies implemented have 
worked well. Yet surprisingly there is very little empirical evidence to conclusively say 
whether this is the case now or before.
3 Japan is an oft-cited classic case where despite 
the many and sizeable fiscal stimulus packages implemented since the burst of the 
bubble in the 1990s, the economy is still mired in anemic growth.  
 
This paper asks the question whether  since the 1990s fiscal policy in the five main 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand) has been effective as a macroeconomic stabilizing tool. As part 
of the exercise, the paper also measures the size of each economy‘s fiscal multiplier—
how much a dollar spent by the government  translates into a change in output. The 
methodology adopted is the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model of Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002). This model has been widely employed in the study of countercyclical 
fiscal  policy  in  developed  countries,  but  not  in  developing  countries,  particularly 
developing Asian economies. The model comprises three variables—taxes, government 
consumption/spending and output—which allows for a distinct examination of tax and 
government spending measures of an economy. This is particularly advantageous since 
fiscal  policy measures often come in the form of both tax and spending  changes.  A 
notable drawback, however, is the inability of the model to examine a specific episode of 
countercyclical  policy.  Put  differently,  it  only  portrays  an  average  estimate  over  the 
selected sample period. As an extension, a time-varying VAR is employed to investigate 
possible changes to the effectiveness of fiscal policy over time. This is perhaps the first 
                                                 
1  See http://www.economist.com/debate/overview/140. 
2  The size of fiscal stimulus was obtained from United States Congressional Budget Office (2010).  
3  See ADB (2010, Part 2) for some recent work.   
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paper  that  applies  a  time-varying  VAR  model  to  study  fiscal  policy  in  developing 
countries.   
 
To  preview  the  results,  government  spending  is  found  to  have  no  immediate  and 
statistically  significant  impact  on  output  in  all  the  countries  studied  here.  Yet  for 
Singapore and Thailand, there is some evidence to show a stronger impact during the 
Asian financial crisis and the current global financial crisis. For Indonesia too, there has 
been  an  improvement  in  the  effectiveness  of  government  spending  since  the  Asian 
financial crisis. On other hand, somewhat surprisingly, tax increases generate output 
growth  in  all  the  countries  (a  phenomenon  commonly  known  as  expansionary  fiscal 
contraction  in  the  literature),  but  this  is  only  statistically  significant  in  Thailand  and 
Indonesia. In general, there seems to be greater evidence of the phenomenon during the 
Asian financial crisis and the global financial crisis, particularly in the Philippines and to a 
lesser extent Malaysia. For Indonesia, however, the puzzle seems to have waned in the 
2000s, after the Asian financial crisis.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the study of the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Section 3 introduces 
the SVAR and time-varying VAR methodologies, while section 4 delves on data and 




2.  Literature on the Impact of Fiscal Policy 
 
2.1   Theory 
 
The effectiveness of fiscal policy as a tool of macroeconomic management has been 
widely  debated,  as  many  empirical  studies  find  different  and  sometimes  conflicting 
results.  The  theoretical  literature  itself  prescribes  different  fiscal  multiplier  size.  The 
Keynesian school generally argues that the fiscal spending multiplier is greater than one, 
while the neoclassical school says it is less than one. On the other hand, under certain 
conditions, the multiplier can turn negative. Table 1 summarizes the main theoretical 
results. 
 
In standard Keynesian theory, government spending allows demand-constrained firms to 
boost output, which raises economy wide income and employment. Households then 
spend part of the higher income. As a result of subsequent rounds of spending, the fiscal 
multiplier becomes greater than one.
4 If stimulus is in the form of tax cuts, the multiplier 
will be lower because unlike government spending which directly feeds into the economy 
and increases income, households still have to decide whether to spend or save part of 
their income, therefore creating less new economic activity.  
                                                 
4  Graphically in the textbook IS-LM framework, fiscal expansion shifts the IS curve to the right, output 
would  have  been  larger  had  interest  rates  not  changed  (increased).  (This  larger  output  at  constant 
interest rates is as per the standard Keynesian spending multiplier, see notes to Table 1). Interest rates 
rise because higher income increases the demand for money (and shift the money demand curve to the 
right) given a constant money supply. As a result, the rise in the interest rates crowds out investment.   




In  contrast,  in  the  neoclassical  model  (for  example,  Baxter  and  King  1993),  higher 
government spending reduces the lifetime income of households as a result of higher 
future tax liability. Responding to this, households reduce consumption and work more, 
raising  labor  supply  and  output  that  partially  offsets  the  reduction  in  consumption. 
Although, the fiscal spending multiplier is positive, it will be less than one because of the 
negative wealth effect on lifetime income reduces consumption.  
 
The standard Keynesian multiplier of greater than one does not always hold, and may 
vary depending on, among other factors, the degree of monetary policy accommodation, 
the exchange rate regime, an economy‘s trade openness, and the extent of financial 
development.  For  example,  based  on  the  IS-LM  framework,  if  government  spending 
which shifts the IS curve to the right is accommodated by monetary policy that maintains 
the initial level of interest rates, then the LM curve will shift to the right to ensure the 
standard  Keynesian  multiplier  of  greater  than  one  is  achieved.    Similarly,  in  an 
environment where the nominal interest rates hit the zero-lower-bound, fiscal stimulus 
will be particularly effective since crowding out of investment from higher interest rates is 
largely absent, and the economy at this stage is likely to be operating at ample excess 
capacity.  These  results  are  also  consistent  with  the  microfounded  new  Keynesian 
models described by Woodford (2010). In addition, the author shows that the multiplier 
can be less than one if government spending increases inflation, and the central bank 
raises interest rates to alleviate the pressure on demand.  
 
On the other hand, the exchange rate regime pursued by a country matters as well. In a 
flexible  exchange  rate  regime,  higher  interest  rates  caused  by  higher  government 
spending will lead to an appreciation of the domestic currency, which reduces exports at 
the expense of higher imports. Hence the multiplier is likely to be lower than the case of 
a fixed exchange rate regime, where interest rates are prevented from rising. On the 
other  hand,  if  an  economy  is  highly  open,  the  leakage  of  government  spending  via 
higher imports will be larger, and leads to an even smaller multiplier.  
 
A prominent view that argues that fiscal spending has no impact on output has come to 
be  popularly  known  as  Ricardian  equivalence  (Barro  1974).  According  to  this  view, 
households who are forward-looking know that debt-financed government spending now 
essentially means higher future taxes that will be imposed to pay for the higher debt. 
Since households have to pay for the higher government spending through the bonds 
they hold, their total wealth is effectively reduced. And given that the government will 
eventually have to pay off its debt by raising taxes, households will respond by reducing 
consumption as savings for the future tax burden—the fall in consumption completely 
offsets the  increase  in  government  spending  and  hence  the multiplier  stays  at  zero. 
Conversely, in the event of a tax cut, households know the current debt-financed tax cut 
means  higher  future  taxes,  which  forces  them  to  save  the  current  extra  disposable 
income  to  pay  for  higher  future  tax  liability.  As  there  is  no  change  in  total  wealth, 
consumption remains unchanged. And since the lower government saving is offset by 
higher private saving, aggregate demand remains unchanged, the multiplier remains at 
zero.
5  
                                                 
5  Most economists agree that the Ricardian equivalence is premised on a set of key assumptions which 
are  unlikely  to  hold  in  the  real  world:  taxes  (lump-sum)  that  are  nondistortionary;  forward-looking  
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Financial innovation and globalization is another factor that affects the size of the fiscal 
multiplier, although its overall impact is ambiguous (IMF 2008). For governments, the 
ability to borrow abroad means less potential for domestic crowding out through higher 
domestic  interest  rates,  which  improves  the  multiplier.  On the  other  hand,  firms  and 
households with greater access to domestic and foreign funding make them less credit 
constrained, thus mitigating some of the impact of discretionary policy changes.  
 
There is another literature that posits the multiplier can in fact be negative—the non-
Keynesian  or  expansionary  fiscal  contraction  (or  conversely,  contractionary  fiscal 
expansion) effect.
6 Theories that explain this phenomenon appear to have followed the 
empirical work by, among others, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Alesina and others 
(1997, 1998 and 2009). And they relate to several core ideas such as credibility of fiscal 
policy,  uncertainty,  debt  sustainability,  and  risk  premium  over  government  bonds. 
Blanchard (1990) formulates a simple theoretical argument from the demand side that 
shows the benefit from early fiscal consolidation could raise households‘ total wealth by 
reducing the uncertainty for more costly and painful adjustment later on. As total wealth 
increases,  consumption  and  aggregate  demand  will  also  rise.
7 Alesina  and  Ardagna 
(2009) add a further channel based on agents‘ expectations on changes in interest rate 
or risk premium on bonds. A credible commitment to avoid a debt default or build-up in 
debt  lowers  agents‘  expectations  of  interest  rate  levels  and  the  risk  premium  on 
government bonds. This translates to lower cost of borrowing and higher financial wealth, 
which  will  in  turn  spur  investment  and  consumption.
8 Miller  et  al.  (1990)  provide  a 
theoretical sketch of higher fiscal expansion that leads to a build-up in government debt, 
which increases the risk premium on government bonds for fear of rising default and 
higher inflation risk, which through higher interest rates reinforce the crowding out effects.  
Hemming et al. (2002) argue that if a fiscal expansion is linked to increased uncertainty, 
precautionary  behavior  by  households  and  firms  will  dominate  and  contribute  to  the 
fiscal multiplier turning negative. In an uncertain environment, the confidence effects are 
likely to be even more important and how agents respond will very much depend on a 
government‘s policy and credibility. 
 
2.2  Empirics 
 
Empirical studies on the effectiveness of fiscal policy are generally done via three ways: 
a structural macroeconomic model; a narrative approach; or using VAR models. There is 
a  wide  variation  of  fiscal  multiplier  estimates—from  less  than  zero  to  over  four—
                                                                                                                                            
households  who  understand  the  intertemporal  government  budget  constraint;  perfect  credit  markets 
where households are not credit constrained and both the government and households face the same 
interest rate; and current households who are around to pay for future tax increases or care about their 
children.  Yet  as  Elmendorf  and  Mankiw  (1998)  states  that  the  Ricardian  equivalence  is  particularly 
important because it ―describe[s] the world, at least as a first approximation‖ and that it reminds ―the rest 
of the profession that the conventional view of government debt is far from scientific certitude‖ (p. 43). 
More  important  is  that  the  idea  offers  a  theoretical  foundation  for  further  analysis  just  like  what  the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem has done on the irrelevance of a firm‘s debt and equity financing.  
6  Occasionally, the term ―anti-Keynesian‖ is also used, for example, Miller et al. (1990). 
7  Blanchard provides a caveat that the effect is most likely in the face of high debt levels.  
8  There is a supply side argument via the labor market, for more details see ibid, pages 4–5.   




depending  on  the  type  of  identifying  assumptions,  the  type  of  fiscal  instrument,  the 
country under study and time periods (Spilimbergo et al. 2008). 
 
In  studies  using  structural  macroeconomic  models,  the  short-term  multiplier  is  often 
positive, the spending multiplier is larger than the tax multiplier, and both are larger when 
fiscal expansion is accommodated by monetary policy. However, in the long-term, the 
multiplier can be negative because of the crowding out effects. These results are to be 
largely expected in line with the many new Keynesian elements in the models. Hemming 
et al. (2002) summarize the results based on, among others, some well-known models 
such as the IMF Multimod model, the OECD Interlink model and the McKibbin-Sachs 
(MSG) model on the US, Germany and Japan.
9 They find that the short-term multiplier 
ranges from 0.6 to 1.4 for the spending multiplier, and 0.3 to 0.8 for the tax multiplier. 
More  recently,  using  the  IMF  Global  Integrated  Monetary  and  Fiscal  Model  (GIMF), 
Freedman et al. (2009) find that when all regions undertake fiscal stimulus together—
global policy coordination—the world spending multiplier is 1.7 and tax multiplier is 0.3.
10 
If monetary policy accommodates fiscal expansion, the multipliers increase to 2.8 and 
0.5 respectively. For all the regions, if each undertakes its own fiscal expansion even 
with monetary policy accommodation, the multipliers decline. For example, for emerging 
Asia, the spending multiplier declines to 1.1 from 2.9. That said, in the long-run, if there 
is a permanent increase in the ratio of debt-to-GDP in the world as a result of the fiscal 
expansion, there will be a permanent 1.3% contraction in GDP.  Even in the short-run, if 
there is a perception of a permanent increase in fiscal deficit coupled with an increased 
in  the  US  risk  premium—due  to  the  lack  of  policy  credibility  and  fear  of  fiscal 
sustainability—the multiplier in the US will be barely positive. In their review of other 
studies, Hemming et al. (2002) also highlight the same point but from the opposite case 
of highly credible fiscal consolidations, which can lead to negative multipliers.  
 
Findings from the VAR based approach are generally positive but less than one for the 
spending  multiplier  and  an  even  lower  value  for  the  tax  multiplier.  For  developing 
countries, the multipliers are even lower. Blanchard and Perotti‘s (2002) SVAR for the 
US shows an impact spending multiplier of 0.9 and a tax multiplier of 0.7. Mountford and 
Uhlig‘s (2009) sign-restriction VAR produces lower values of 0.6 and 0.3 respectively. 
Perotti (2004) analyzes five OECD countries dividing them into two periods, and find that 
only in the US is the spending multiplier larger than one in the pre-1980 period. That said, 
in all the countries, the multiplier has declined over time. Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh 
(2009)  look  at  45  countries  (20  advanced  and  25  developing)  and  find  the  impact 
spending multipliers from different experiments to be consistent with theories: advanced 
countries (0.24) versus (0.04) developing countries; fixed exchange rate regime  (0.2) 
versus  (-0.04) flexible exchange rate regime;  and  closed economies (0.26) versus (-
0.05) open  economies.  In  addition,  the  more  indebted  developing  countries (debt-to-
                                                 
9  See also Coenen et al. (2010) who examine a variety of more recent national and global macro models 
on the US and the euro area/European Union and draw similar conclusions.  
10  Only the first year multiplier is presented here. GIMF comprises five countries/regions: the US, the Euro 
area, Japan, Emerging Asia and the Rest of the World. The authors simulate the model with two years of 
fiscal  stimulus  based  on  four  different  fiscal  instruments:  lump  sum  transfers;  labor  income  tax; 
government investment; and targeted transfers. With monetary accommodation, the targeted transfers 
multiplier is 1.1, and the lump sum transfers, 0.5.  
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GDP ratio above 50 percent) have a spending multiplier that turns negative after only 
four quarters.  
 
To  sidestep  the  difficulty  in  identifying  fiscal  shocks  from  a  VAR  approach,  some 
researchers  have  relied  on  historical  record  of  legislations  and  public  statements  to 
identify events that are exogenous from output fluctuations. Romer and Romer (2010) 
identify the exogenous tax events in the US as those aimed at ―addressing an inherited 
budget deficit and promoting long-term growth‖ (page 799). They find that tax increases 
are  highly  contractionary  giving  a  multiplier  of  three.  Meanwhile,  Ramey  (2009,  and 
Ramey and Shapiro 1998) examines military build-ups as an indicator of government 
spending based on information from Business Week and other newspaper sources. She 
finds that the multiplier is around one including World War II or around 0.6 to 0.8 when 
World War II is excluded.
11 This number however is not markedly different from the VAR 
estimates.
12  Despite  being  resource  intensive,  a  particular  drawback  is  that  the 
specificity of these studies means the results cannot be easily applied to a general case 
of discretionary fiscal spending.   
 
In terms of the studies that examine Asia, they are only a few. Eskesen (2009) and Jha 
et al. (2010) are closest to our study from a methodological perspective.
13 Eskesen only 
examines Singapore using the Blanchard and Perotti SVAR, while Jha et al. use the 
Mountford and Uhlig sign restrictions VAR on a larger sample of 10 developing Asian 
countries  including  those  in  our  sample.  They  find  a  largely  weak  and  insignificant 
impact of government spending on output.
14  Jha et al. also find an expansionary fiscal 
contraction (in terms of a positive tax shock) on output in the People‘s Republic of China; 
Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand. In Eskesen‘s paper, although the response of 
output to a tax shock presented shows a rise, the author makes no reference to whether 
this relates to an expansionary fiscal contraction or that a negative tax shock has been 
invoked.  
 
In the rest of this section, we look more closely at the empirical evidence that supports 
the expansionary fiscal contraction phenomenon or the non-Keynesian effect and factors 
that  may  explain  it.
15 Giavazzi  and  Pagano  (1990)  is  one  of  the  foremost  papers 
                                                 
11  See also Barro and Redlick (2009). 
12  Ramey also has another issue with the VAR identification approach. She shows the failure of the VAR 
approach to take account the announcement effects of fiscal policy is the reason for the observed rise in 
consumption  from  a  spending  shock  commonly  found  in  a  VAR  model  as  opposed  to  a  fall  in 
consumption  in  the  narrative  approach.  That  is,  the  VAR  approach  only  captures  the  actual  policy 
changes  when  implemented,  and  not  agents‘  behavioral  change  associated  with  the  policy 
announcement itself.   
13  We  also  found  two  other  studies  which  use  a  different  methodology.  Chang  et  al.  (2002)  use  a 
cointegration approach and find that for the three countries they study (Thailand, Republic of Korea and 
Taipei,China), fiscal policy has no impact on output growth. Ducanes et al. (2006) apply a structural 
model on four countries (Bangladesh, People‘s Republic of China, Indonesia and the Philippines). They 
find that government spending is more useful than tax cuts, and it is more effective in the Philippines 
than in Indonesia, but even so, all multipliers are less than one.  
14  Eskesen‘s results did not include the confidence interval band.  
15  To  be specific,  these  studies  mostly deal  with  episodes of  large fiscal  imbalances.  Hence,  the  non-
Keynesian effects should not be generalized to apply at all times.   




supporting the non-Keynesian result based on the fiscal consolidation experiences in 
Denmark and Ireland in the 1980s. An earlier work is by Fels and Froenlich (1987) on 
Germany‘s experience in early 1980s. The authors cite ―psychological crowding out‖ of 
the private sector as a key reason for the outcome. Alesina and Ardagna (2009) is an 
update of their earlier work on episodes of fiscal stimuli and fiscal adjustments in the 
OECD  countries from  1970  to  2007. The  authors  find  that fiscal  adjustments  on the 
spending side can be expansionary on the economy (tax hike is still contractionary).
16 In 
a study that looks at low-income economies in the 1990s, Gupta et al. (2002) find cutting 
current (rather than development) expenditures are most conducive to growth, especially 
if  the  initial  fiscal  positions  are  already  weak.  In  IMF  (2008),  the  authors  single  out 
downturns,  and  find  that  the  impact  of  discretionary  fiscal  stimulus,  regardless  in 
advanced or emerging economies tend to be negative (contractionary). Furthermore, the 
impact is worse in highly indebted countries.
17 
 
Interest rates are the main conduit of crowding out and they have been found to be 
affected by levels of budget deficit, debt, financial openness, risk premium and credibility. 
In Aisen and Hauner (2008), the authors find that higher budget deficits lead to higher 
interest rates based on a panel of 60 advanced and emerging economies from 1970 to 
2006. The relationship is more robust and larger in the emerging economies than the 
advanced economies. Overall, the relationship tends to be significantly positive if the 
budget deficits are high; when they are domestically financed; when they interact with 
high  domestic  debt;  interest  rates  are  liberalized;  and  when  financial  openness  and 
financial  depth  are  low.  Separately,  Baldacci  et  al.  (2008)  examine  a  panel  of  30 
emerging market economies from 1997 to 2007 using the sovereign bond spreads as a 
measure of risk premium. They find that bond spreads increase with higher levels of 
political risk, but decrease with fiscal consolidation efforts especially in countries with 
prior defaults.  
 
Credibility also has important influence on fiscal policy effectiveness. Kandil and Morsy 
(2010) use international reserves as a measure of credibility. They look at 34 emerging 
economies with data as early as 1960s and obtain a number of interesting results. First, 
fiscal policy appears to be procyclical, meaning a positive output gap leads to greater 
discretionary fiscal stimulus. Yet the presence of high reserves can mitigate this effect—
discretionary fiscal policy can be countercyclical. They then examine the impact of fiscal 
policy on output under different scenarios. For high-reserves economies, there seems to 
be some stimulatory impact of fiscal policy in the short-run, but not in the long-run. For 
high-inflation economies, there is a contractionary impact in the short-run, and not in the 
long-run.
18 For high-debt countries, the contractionary impact prevails both in the short- 
and long-run. The exchange rate system and trade openness do not seem to have an 
impact in either the short- or long-run.  
 
 
                                                 
16  IMF  (2010,  Chapter  3)  took  particular  issue  with  the  way  the  authors  identify  the  periods  of  fiscal 
adjustments, which according to the IMF have contributed to the misleading results.   
17  See IMF (2008, Table 5.4). 
18  In an environment of high inflation, fiscal spending increases inflation expectations and borrowing costs, 
affecting policy credibility and hence fiscal policy effectiveness.  
8          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 70 
 
 
3.  Methodology 
 
3.1   Blanchard and Perotti SVAR 
 
A distinguishing feature of the Blanchard and Perotti SVAR framework is that it relies on 
institutional information on the tax and transfer system and the timing of tax collections 
to separate the automatic response of taxes and spending to economic activity, and in 
doing  so,  isolate  the  effects  of  discretionary  fiscal  shocks.  There  are  two  particular 
strengths to this approach. First, discretionary fiscal policy is generally exogenous to 
output. Unlike monetary policy, fiscal variables are affected by many factors of which 
output stabilization is seldom the main driver. Second, at high enough frequency and 
because of the long lags of fiscal policy implementation, there will be very little or no 
discretionary  response  of  fiscal  policy  to  unexpected  contemporaneous  economic 
activity within the quarter.  
 
The identification restrictions of the Blanchard and Perotti SVAR can be expressed as a 
class of AB SVAR model in Amisano and Giannini (1997) in matrix form: 
 
13 1 11 12 1
23 2 21 22 2
31 32 3 33 3
,
1 0 0







a b b u
a b b u






     
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     
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Ais a n×n matrix of contemporaneous relations among the variables;  t  is the vector of 
the normally independently distributed reduced form residuals with variance-covariance. 
' E( ) tt  ;  B is  a  n×n  matrix  that  allows  some  shocks  to  affect  more  than  one 
endogenous variable in the model; and  t U is the vector of structural shocks of policy and 
non-policy variables, where Ut ~ N(0,In) and E( ) 0 ts UU  for  . ts   
 
Expanding the above matrix and denoting the three variables as taxes (tx), government 
spending (s), and real GDP (y) gives: 
 
  13 11 12 ,
y tx tx s
t t t t a b u b u              (1) 
  23 21 22 ,
y s tx s
t t t t a b u b u              (2) 
  31 32 33 .
yy tx s
t t t t a a b u                (3) 
 
Equation (1) says that unexpected movements in taxes in the current quarter() tx
t  are 
related to unexpected movements in economic activity( ),
y
t   structural shocks to taxes 
() tx
t u , and structural shocks to government spending ( ). s
t u The same applies to Equation 
(2),  for  unexpected  movements  in  government  spending.  Equation  (3)  relates  




unexpected  movements  in  economic  activity  ()
y
t   to  unexpected  movements  in  both 
taxes and government spending, as well as its own structural shocks()
y
t u .  
 
From matrices A and B, there are nine parameters that need to be estimated based on 
six  knowns  (given   has  n(n+1)/2  unique  elements),  which  means  further  three 
restrictions have to be imposed. First, Blanchard and Perotti estimate  13 a ,the elasticity of 
taxes to GDP separately. They follow the calculations of Giorno et al. (1995),  which 
depend on the summation of the elasticity of each tax category weighted by the tax base. 
Here, due to the lack of information on different tax categories,  13 a is estimated from a 
simple  regression  of  taxes  on  GDP.  Second,  they  assume  23, a the  elasticity  of 
government spending to GDP, is zero. This essentially assumes there is no automatic 
feedback from economic activity to government purchases of goods and services within 
the quarter. It is important to recognize that both  13 a and  23 a can  potentially be affected 
by  the  discretionary  fiscal  policy  changes  with  respect  to  economic  shocks.  Yet 
realistically  due  to  the  lag  in  policy  implementation,  it  is  unlikely  either  13 a or  23 a  can 
capture the discretionary fiscal policy effects especially with the use of quarterly data.
19 
Third,  they  decide  to  let  12 b  be  zero,  implying  that  tax  decisions  are  made  before 
spending decisions. This means a tax shock affects spending contemporaneously and 
not the reverse. Since there is no straightforward way to determine this, they also try the 
reverse, that is, by letting  21 b be zero so that  12 b can be estimated. Their results as in our 
case are robust to this change.
20 Hence, for simplicity, we continue to let  12 b be zero.  
   
We  also  present  the  case  of  Cholesky  VAR  in  our  results  as  comparison  to  the 
Blanchard  and  Perotti  SVAR.  In  the  Cholesky  VAR,  the  endogenous  variables  are 
positioned in the same order as in the Blanchard and Perotti SVAR—tx, s and y—A 
becomes a lower triangular matrix with the value of one at the diagonal elements and, B, 
a  diagonal  matrix.  Hence, 
1 0 A A B
  become  the  famous  lower  triangular  matrix  of 
Cholesky  decomposition,  with  the  diagonal  elements  being  the  standard  deviation  of 
each structural shock.     
 
3.2  Time-Varying VAR Model 
 
To investigate the time-varying effects of fiscal policy over the sample, the VAR model 
outlined  above  is  extended  in  two  important  dimensions.    First,  we  allow  for  time 
variation in the autoregressive coefficients of the VAR model.  Second, we allow for 
stochastic  volatility  of  the  reduced-form  error  terms.    The  reduced-form  time-varying 
VAR can be summarized as: 
 
                                                 
19  Theorectically, a13 and a23 can capture both the automatic effects of economic activity on taxes and 
government  spending  as  well  as  the  discretionary  fiscal  response  to  unexpected  economic  events. 
Nevertheless, the use of quarterly data effectively implies only the automatic effects of economic activity 
are accounted for. And since a23 is assumed to be zero in the model, a13 essentially captures only the 
automatic effects of economic activity on taxes. 
20  These results are not presented for brevity but can be obtained from the authors.  




                      .    .         (4) 
 
Following  Cogley  and  Sargent  (2005)  and  Primiceri  (2005),  the  VAR's  time-varying 
parameters, collected in the vector  t  , are postulated to evolve as a random walk such 
that: 
 
                          ,               (5)   
 
with                         . The VAR's reduced-form innovations in (5) are postulated to be 
zero-mean and normally distributed, with time-varying covariance matrix  t   which can 
be factored as 
 
                          .             (6) 
 







with hi,t  evolving as geometric random walks, 
 
 ..                        (7) 
 
 
Following  Primiceri  (2005),  we  postulate  the  non-zero  and  non-one  elements  of  the 
matrix  t A  (collected  in  the  vector  21, 31, 32, ,, t t t t         )  to  evolve  as  driftless  random 
walks, 
 
                               .               (8)  
 
Finally,  we  assume  the  vector  of  error  terms   of  the  system  to  be 
distributed as  
 
 




where  t u  is the structural error terms of the VAR such that  1/2 1
t t t t A H u    . The block-
diagonal structure of  V assumes that the idiosyncratic error terms of the system are 
uncorrelated  with  each  other.    Lastly,  we  also  adopt  the  additional  simplifying 
assumption of postulating a block-diagonal structure for S, namely,  





      ,                     (10)   
 
 
with  1 21, ( ), t S Var   and  2 21, 32, ([ , ] ). tt S Var    This implies that the non-zero and non-one 
elements of  t A  belonging to different rows (equations of the VAR) evolve independently. 
As  discussed  in  Primiceri  (2005), this  assumption  drastically  simplifies  inference  and 
allows the estimation procedure to apply Gibbs sampling on the non-zero and non-one 
elements of  t A  equation by equation.  
 
We  estimate  Equations  (4)–(10)  using  Bayesian  methods.  The  basic  steps  of  the 
algorithm are as follows.
21 First, given the initial values for  t A  and  t H , simulate the VAR 
parameters and hyperparameters.  Next, conditional on the VAR parameters, draw the 
stochastic volatilities , () it h . Finally, conditional on all other parameters, draw the elements 
of  t A  equation by equation. The algorithm uses 250,000 Gibbs sampling replications and 
discards the first 200,000 as burn-in.  We retain 1,000 draws after the burn-in sample (by 
skipping every 50th draw) for the computation of the impulse response functions. The 
posterior moments vary little over the retained draws providing evidence of convergence. 
 
 
4.  Data and Estimations 
 
Quarterly  data  from  mostly  1990:1  to  2009:4  for  the  five  main  ASEAN  countries 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) are collected from various 
sources such as the CEIC databases, the World Bank‘s World Development Indicators 
and websites of national statistical offices/central banks (for detailed data sources and 
descriptions, please see Appendix I).  Blanchard and Perotti (2002) define net taxes as 
total  tax  revenue  minus  grants  and  interest  payments.  Nonetheless,  due  to  data 
limitations and the fact we try to use the longest available series, none of our tax variable 
meets this definition. Therefore, for Indonesia, the tax variable refers to total government 
revenue; Malaysia and the Philippines, total tax revenue minus interest payments; and 
Singapore and Thailand, total tax revenue. For GDP and government spending, the data 
are  obtained  from  the  respective  national  accounts.  Due  to  the  unavailability  of  the 




Following Blanchard and Perotti, all data are expressed in natural logarithm, real and per 
capita  terms.  We  seasonally  adjust  all  the  data  in  their  natural  log  form  using  the 
standard  X11  methodology.  Then  we  express  them  in  per  capita  terms.  The  annual 
population  data  from  World  Development  Indicators  are  converted  to  quarterly  data 
                                                 
21  See Kim and Nelson (1999) for more details. 
22  Quarterly  investment  data  from  national  accounts  are  only  available  for  Thailand.  In  the  spirit  of 
Blanchard and Perotti, we did not use current and development expenditure data from fiscal accounts. 
Jha et al. (2010) use the latter and produce largely similar results to ours especially in the context of 
government spending shock on output. (Both our tax data were from the fiscal accounts).   
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using a simple linear interpolation.  Since the population data end in 2008, the 2009 
projection  is  based  on  the  average  growth  rate  from  2003  to  2008.    GDP  deflator 
obtained from taking the ratio of nominal and real GDP are subsequently used to deflate 
the data. Lastly, the data are linearly detrended—hence, variations in the transformed 
data are in essence movements around a long-run equilibrium.  
 
In both the Cholesky and SVAR estimations, the same lag length is used based on the 
most  commonly  recommended  lag  order  by  the  standard  information  criteria  of 
sequential modified likelihood ratio, Final Prediction Error, Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-
Quinn.  For Indonesia, the lag order is one; Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, two; and 
Singapore, three.  Both the Cholesky and SVAR are also estimated with a constant.  
 
The estimated elasticity of taxes to GDP, based on a simple regression between the two 
variables, for Indonesia is 0.63; Malaysia, 1.61; Philippines, 1.04; Singapore, 1.10; and 
Thailand, 1.90.  As robustness checks, we also compare the results when the elasticity 
is 0.5, a number Eskesen (2009) uses for Singapore.  
 
 
5.  Results 
 
5.1  Basic Model 
 
Figures  1  to  5  show  each  country's  impulse  response  function  of  GDP  to  the  three 
shocks  of taxes ("Shock  1"  in the  plot), government  spending  ("Shock  2")  and GDP 
("Shock 3") respectively. Each shock is normalized to have a contemporaneous impact 
of one-percentage point increase. As comparison, results from three VAR specifications 
are presented: the Cholesky VAR; the Blanchard and Perotti SVAR with an estimated 
elasticity of taxes to GDP; and the Blanchard and Perotti SVAR with a chosen elasticity 
of net taxes to GDP (a13) of 0.5.   
 
In general, the overall results are not sensitive to any particular specification type. And 
whether the elasticity of net taxes to GDP is estimated or assumed to be 0.5 does not 
seem to matter a great deal. That said, three key results can be gleaned.  First, the 
impulse  response  of  GDP  to  a  positive  tax  shock  produces  a  rise  in  GDP  in  all 
economies. The effect seems particularly strong for Indonesia and Thailand, as they are 
both  significant  for  ten  quarters  and  peak  at  between  two  to  four  quarters  across 
different  model  specifications.  Second,  in  all  countries,  by  and  large,  the  impulse 
responses of GDP to a government spending shock are close to zero and statistically 
insignificant. Statistical insignificance aside, there are notable variations in the dynamics 
of the impulse response which will be discussed below. Third, from Tables 2 and 3, the 
impact  fiscal  multiplier  of  either  the  tax  shock  or  the  government  spending  shock  is 
generally very small and less than one. The result is significant only in case of the tax 
shock, and only in Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia (when the elasticity of net taxes is 
calculated). The only multiplier greater than one, be it tax or spending, is that of Thailand 
with respect to the tax shock and when a13 is estimated. 
 
It  is  unclear  why  we  only  find  a  consistent  expansionary  impact  on  output  with  the 
positive  tax  shock,  but  not  with  spending  cut.  One  reason  could  be  that  fiscal  




adjustments have been more commonly carried out through tax changes. Makin (2005) 
argues that there is less scope for most of these countries to curtail growth-enhancing or 
productivity  driven  expenditures  such  as  transport  infrastructure,  power, 
telecommunications and education. Being developing countries, these expenditures are 
essential  to  future  economic  development.  In  contrast,  the  revenue  shares  of  these 
countries are much lower than international standards. Hence, there is ample room to 
broaden revenue bases through new tax policies and administrative reforms.  
 
For small and open economies, the leakage of fiscal spending through higher imports is 
a  key  channel  that  negates  the  stimulative  effects.  This  factor  is  likely  to  be  most 
relevant  for  Singapore,  Malaysia  and  Thailand,  each  being  a  small  and  highly  open 
economy  with  a  share  of  total  trade  to  GDP  of  283%  (in  2009),  146%  and  108% 
respectively. Philippines‘s ratio is slightly lower at 51%, and Indonesia‘s, 39%. This is in 
line with the findings by Ilzetzki et al. (2009). In their study, an open economy is defined 
as having a share of total trade to GDP of over 60%. For this group, they find both the 
impact and the long-run responses of output to a government spending shock are not 
statistically different from zero.  
 
The choice of exchange rate regime may  have  also  weakened  the multiplier  effects. 
Apart from Malaysia which fixed its exchange rate for a brief period of time, most other 
countries  have  adopted  a  more  flexible  exchange  rate  regime  particularly  since  the 
Asian  financial  crisis.
23 Finding  by  Ilzetzki  et  al.  lends  support,  where  the  output 
response to a government spending shock of economies adopting a flexible exchange 
rate regime are found to be weakly negative and statistically insignificant.   
 
Generally, there might have been some degree of monetary policy accommodation, yet 
interest rates were never allowed to fall too much due to other concerns and they were 
never close to the zero bound. This lack of monetary policy accommodation could have 
mitigated or even reversed the expansionary fiscal impact. While it is true that policy 
interest rates in the ASEAN5 were reduced in the face of the current global financial 
crisis, they were however not as large as the reductions in the US, which have hit zero 
bound since late 2008. Meanwhile, during the Asian financial crisis, interest rates were 
kept relatively high even up to the end of 1998 to allay fears of further capital outflows 
and to reinforce confidence in domestic asset holdings. This happened in spite of an 
already contracting output seen as early as the second quarter of 1997 in Thailand and, 
in the first half of 1998 in the other countries. Interest rates did fall but they happened too 
late. And the recovery from the crisis for these countries was largely driven by the quick 
turnaround in external demand, where domestic interest rates had little or no influence.   
 
There is some evidence that the underlying financial conditions in some of the countries 
may  have  facilitated  the  crowding  out  effects  through  greater  upward  pressures  on 
interest rates.
24  In particular, Indonesia and the Philippines can be considered as low 
financial depth countries, less so Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore (Figure 8). In low 
financial  depth  countries,  funding  competition  between  the  private  sector  and  the 
                                                 
23  See for example ADB (2007, Box 2). 
24  Recall,  Aisen  and  Hauner  (2008)  find  financial  depth,  repression  and  openness  all  have  important 
influence on interest rates (see Section 2.2).   
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government in a smaller pool of funds puts greater upward pressures on interest rates, 
which intensifies the crowding out effects. In fact, the effects seem to have worsened 
after the Asian financial crisis, whereby the financial depths in most countries have yet to 
recover  to  their  pre-crisis  levels.  Separately,  the  extent  of  financial  repression  also 
matters. If financial repression is high as when interest rates are controlled, chances of 
interest  rates  rising  when  government  borrowing  increases  will  be  lower.  Financial 
repression as proxied by interest rate liberalizations indicate that interest rates in the 
ASEAN5  have  largely  been  liberalized,  suggesting greater  potential for  crowding  out 
(Figure 9). On the other hand, greater financial openness works against the crowding out 
effects.  In  terms  of  capital  account  liberalization,  a  measure  of  financial  openness, 
capital  account  in  most  of  the  countries  has  been  largely  liberalized,  thus  mitigating 
some of the crowding out effects (see Figure 10).  
 
Persistent and large budget deficit to GDP balances will increase the debt levels and 
bring the issue of debt sustainability to the forefront especially during times of crisis. 
Apart from Singapore, the budget balance-to-GDP ratios of the other countries have 
remained in deficit since the Asian financial crisis (see Figure 11). While they may not be 
very large, they have persisted and have worsened during the global financial crisis. This 
is true even before the 1990s, again with the exception of Singapore and, to a lesser 
extent, Thailand. That said,  Indonesia and Thailand, in contrast to Malaysia and the 
Philippines,  had  made greater gains  in  reducing  the  deficits  in recent years,  despite 
being the worst hit countries during the Asian financial crisis.  
 
Considering  even  for  the  developed  countries  where  fiscal  situations  can  deteriorate 
markedly very quickly, the overall evidence does not provide overwhelming support that 
the  countries  have  put  paid  to  the  issue  of  debt  sustainability.  There  is  no  one 
acceptable yardstick that differentiates whether a country is or is not  likely to face a 
sovereign debt problem. The 60% total debt to GDP rule used for countries in the euro 
system would suggest that most of the ASEAN5 are generally safe (see Figure 12). Yet 
this  rule  is  too  lenient  for  developing  countries,  which  tend  to  have  poorer  tax 
administration and expenditure management, poorer governance, more volatile revenue 
bases, and longer lags affecting fiscal policy (Hemming et al. 2002). As noted by IMF 
(2003),  this  rule  would  have  failed  to  capture  the  majority  (55%)  of  the  defaults  in 
emerging  economies.  Even  among  the  developed  (euro)  countries  currently  facing 
sovereign debt concerns, their debt-to-GDP levels prior to the global financial crisis were 
not particularly alarming—around 60% or below—Portugal (63% in 2007), Ireland (25%), 
Spain  (36%),  except  Greece  (96%).  A  more  conservative/reasonable  yardstick  is 
adopted  by  IMF  (2008),  whereby  above  25%  is  considered  high  debt  emerging 
economies.  Based  on  this  threshold,  clearly  all  the  ASEAN5  countries  are  in  a  less 
comfortable zone. 
 
Fiscal credibility matters as much as the stock of debt at any point in time. Past record of 
fiscal  conservatism  and  probity  burnish  credibility  and  instill  more  confidence  among 
agents that allow debt levels to drift higher without causing too much concern. In a debt 
sustainability study on the ASEAN4 countries minus Singapore  by Makin (2005), the 
Philippines and Indonesia, in particular, are found to require the accumulation of larger 
primary balances in order to lower public debt to more prudent levels to avoid a potential 
crisis. Makin uses data up to 2003, which since then has seen improved fiscal position in  




Indonesia,  but  a  weakened  position  in  Malaysia.  Still,  as  late  as  1999,  Indonesia 
defaulted on and restructured its debt, and the same happened to the Philippines much 
earlier in 1983 (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 2006).
25 Philippines‘s public debt to GDP 
ratio is among the highest, and it has hovered around the 60–80% range since 1985, 
although it has improved somewhat in recent years (see Figure 12). Indonesia‘s position 
worsened amid the Asian financial crisis due to efforts by the government to tackle the 
problems  emanating  from  the  private  sector  and  the  failed  banks.  Thailand‘s  only 
aberration was during the Asian financial crisis in an otherwise relatively low public debt 
environment. Malaysia took more than a decade to reduce its public debt ratio of over 
100%  since  the  twin-deficit  crisis  in  the  mid-1980s  to  less  than  40%.  Nevertheless, 
despite the good economic years before the global financial crisis, its ratio has stayed 
above 40%. Singapore‘s rising debt ratio throughout the 1990s, now reaching over 100%, 
looks ―worrying‖. In times of uncertainty, where early exit is at a premium and headline 




5.2  Time-Varying VAR 
 
Figures 6.1 and 7.1 plot the time-varying response of GDP to a positive one-unit tax and 
government spending shock across the five countries respectively. Figures 6.2 and 7.2 
present the cumulative GDP response at the one- and two-year horizons to show the 
cumulative impact more clearly. The overall results are summarized in Table 4.  
 
In Indonesia, the largely positive impact on output of a tax shock in the 1990s may have 
to do with the accommodative monetary policy stance taken by the central bank. As 
Nasution  (2003)  points  out  that  ―the  central  bank  can  assist  fiscal  sustainability  by 
maintaining relatively low interest rates to encourage economic recovery and lighten the 
government‘s interest burden without sacrificing monetary objectives‖ (page 155). Our 
Cholesky VAR result incorporating an additional policy rate variable supports this as a 
positive tax shock coincides with a decline in the policy rate.
27 Since 2000, however, the 
expansionary impact on output from a tax shock has gotten smaller and turned to be 
somewhat contractionary. This may likely reflect the improved public administration and 
reforms undertaken following the Asian financial crisis (ibid). On the other  hand, the 
smaller contraction (improvement) in output response to a spending shock since 2000 
                                                 
25  See Reinhart (2010, Table 1.1, page 9) provided an even longer history of defaults particularly external 
defaults. In Indonesia‘s case, three in total: 1966 to 1970; 1998 to 2000; and 2002; and the Philippines‘s, 
one: 1983 to 1992. Malaysia and Singapore have never defaulted, although Thailand came close in 
1997/98. 
26  Net instead of gross public debt to GDP (as reported here) would be a better gauge of a government‘s 
financial strength. Nonetheless, this number is not as commonly available. We found the availability of 
net  debt  for  the  OECD  countries  from  the  statistical  annex  tables  in  the  OECD  Economic  Outlook. 
Singapore‘s gross public debt is indeed very high. But its large bond issuance is to meet the investment 
needs of compulsory savings through the Central Provident Fund and to serve as benchmark for the 
development of the domestic bond market. 
27  Nasution also makes the point Indonesia‘s fiscal policy has been directed to maintain a balanced budget. 
If this means when output growth rises too much, hence government spending is reduced and taxes are 
increased accordingly, then there is some evidence from the Cholesky VAR to support this.     
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may  also  reflect  the  improved  macroeconomic  management  and  economic 
fundamentals of the country since the period.  
 
In Malaysia, the expansionary response of output to a tax shock is most evident during 
the  two  major  crisis  periods.  In  normal  times,  however,  the  standard  evidence  of  a 
contractionary impact on output largely prevails. Taken together, it is quite clear that the 
overall result from the Blanchard and Perotti SVAR is dominated by the crisis effects. 
And more important, during crisis when there is greater uncertainty and heightened risk 
premium, the tax cuts may have been interpreted as weakening the fiscal resolve of the 
government with which agents‘ response with excessive belt tightening (see Hemming et 
al. 2002). On spending shock, the output response is largely muted plausibly due to 
leakage  through  the  high  trade  openness  as  mentioned  above.  Interestingly,  the 
implementation  of  capital  controls  in  1998  to  insulate  the  economy  from  external 
disturbances did not seem to have any notable impact on the government‘s intended 
efforts to jump-start the economy during the Asian financial crisis. On the contrary, there 
is evidence to suggest the opposite since then. 
 
Similarly  in  the  Philippines,  the  expansionary  of  output  to  a  tax  shock  is  also  most 
prevalent during the two crisis periods. Yet in the Philippines‘s case, the effect is more 
pronounced—lasting more than a few years around the crisis periods. This seems to 
reflect agents‘ greater weariness of the perennial Philippine fiscal weakness and high 
level of public debt vis-à-vis to say Malaysia‘s. In addition, there is evidence from the 
standard VAR suggesting that taxes are procyclical to output growth as the impact of a 
positive output shock leads to rising taxes. IMF (2009) also reinforces this, where it is 
shown that negative fiscal stance (deficit) often corresponds with a positive output gap. 
This means with the exception of a few years after the Asian financial crisis, where the 
output gaps turned negative, had higher taxes were implemented during the good times, 
output  would  have  been  boosted further  as  households  and firms  see  these  as  real 
commitments to better manage the country‘s fiscal balance and the high-debt level. In 
terms of the spending shock, the largely negative output response after 2000 (compared 
with the earlier decade) coincides with the period of higher public debt, especially after 
the  Asian  financial  crisis  and  larger  budget  deficit.  From  1994  to  1997,  the  country 
actually enjoyed a rare period of fiscal surplus, while the deficit in the early 1990s was 
smaller  around  1–3%  of  GDP  (see  Figure  11).  Interestingly,  the  improvement  in  the 
output response in recent years (Figure 7.2) has also coincided with the improvements 
in the public debt level and the budget deficit.  
 
In Singapore, the expansionary response of output to a tax shock is most evident during 
the recent global financial crisis, which also happens to be the sharpest recession in its 
history. Given this extreme uncertain environment already affected by an export collapse, 
there was undoubtedly a heightened fear and anxiety which forced households to save 
more,  firms  to  lay  off  workers  and  to  reduce  spending  and  investment.  Tax  cuts 
implemented could reinforce this negative sentiment and pull output down. On spending 
shock, there is some evidence to show that when the government did spend, especially 
during the two crisis periods, it had some marginal impact on output. Nonetheless, due 
to the country‘s very high openness, the likelihood of leakage was generally very high. 
  




In Thailand, too, the expansionary response of output to a tax shock is most evident 
during the recent global financial crisis. However, in Thailand‘s case, it was the second 
most severe recession in history after the Asian financial crisis. Coupled with the long-
drawn political crisis, the same loss of confidence and heightened fear as in Singapore 
would  also  be  prevalent  which  possibly  explains  the  evidence  of  a  larger  output 
expansion during this period. There is some evidence that government spending during 
the Asian financial crisis is more effective especially at the one-year horizon. This being 
the deepest recession in its history clearly suggests that there was ample capacity in the 




6.  Conclusion  
 
In this paper, we have attempted to answer the question of whether fiscal policy is an 
effective macroeconomic tool in influencing output in the main five ASEAN countries. It is 
the  counterpart  to  the  role  of  monetary  policy  in  influencing  output  and/or  inflation. 
Surprisingly,  there  has  been  very  little  empirical  work  done  on  these  countries.  And 
judging from the active use of discretionary fiscal stimulus especially during the recent 
global financial crisis, it would seem that policymakers have unequivocal confidence in 
its efficacy. What we find, however, is quite different. Our Blanchard and Perotti SVAR 
model shows for government spending, the overall impact on output is largely benign—
the impact fiscal multiplier is very much less than one and statistically insignificant. This 
is true in all ASEAN5. And in the case of tax measures, a consistent pattern of output 
expansion  with  fiscal  contraction  is  observed,  although  the  result  is  only  statistically 
significant in Indonesia and Thailand.  
 
The  literature  offers  several  explanations.  Being  small  and  highly  open  economies, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and to a lesser extent the Philippines and Indonesia, are 
very susceptible to fiscal stimulus that leaks out through higher imports. Coupled with 
the adoption of a more flexible exchange rate regime especially after the Asian financial 
crisis, the leakage would have been greater. In addition, the combination of low financial 
depth and largely liberalized interest rate environment particularly in the Philippines and 
Indonesia  facilitate  the  crowding  out  effects  through  greater  upward  pressures  on 
interest  rates.  And  when  monetary  policy  accommodation  is  not  forthcoming,  the 
crowding out effects would be even larger.  
 
More important, fiscal credibility characterized by a good track record of budget balances 
and low public debt level is key to policy effectiveness. The lack of fiscal credibility is a 
major  factor  that  contributes  to  the  expansionary  fiscal  contraction  phenomenon 
observed in many other studies. Among the ASEAN5, many have run persistent budget 
deficits with the exception of Singapore. Their public debt levels may be considered as 
comfortable  for  developed  countries,  but  not  for  developing  countries  epitomized  by 
weak fiscal management and institutions, and a small tax base. The Philippines‘s fiscal 
weaknesses are well known and including Indonesia are two countries that have faced 
sovereign debt problems and restructured their debt. Thailand came close during the 
Asian  financial  crisis  and  Malaysia  has  shown  signs  of  weaknesses.  Singapore‘s 
headline debt level of over 100% of GDP is startling but misleading.   
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While the Blanchard and Perotti SVAR only summarizes the dominant influence over 
time,  we  suspect  there  may  be  times  when  either  the  government  spending  or  tax 
change is more or less effective. To do this, we employ a time-varying VAR model. We 
find that the expansionary impact of output to a positive tax shock in most countries is 
most  prominent  during  crisis  periods.  In  the  Philippines,  for  example,  this  is  most 
obvious, in both the Asian financial crisis and the global financial crisis lasting quite a 
few years. Similar, evidence is found in Malaysia, but not as long lasting, and in Thailand 
and Singapore, mostly during the global financial crisis. In Indonesia, this phenomenon 
is most prevalent before the Asian financial crisis, but has improved in line with the fiscal 
reforms undertaken since then.  
 
On the other hand, in terms of the impact on output of a government spending shock, 
Indonesia‘s  fiscal  policy  effectiveness  appears  to  have  improved  since  the  Asian 
financial  crisis  in  line  with  improved  macroeconomic  management.  The  Philippines 
meanwhile  follow  the  opposite  path  of  deteriorating  government  spending  impact  on 
output. Given its weak fiscal credibility and further rise in public debt level and persistent 
budget deficit since the Asian financial crisis, these actions do not bode well with market 
confidence.  In  Malaysia,  too,  while  the  impact  on  output  of  a  government  spending 
shock  is  small  but  largely  positive  before  the  Asian  financial  crisis,  it  has  turned 
somewhat  negative  since  then.  This  may  have  to  do  with  the  introduction  of  capital 
controls during the Asian financial crisis and subsequent fiscal weaknesses. In Thailand 
and  Singapore,  there  is  more  evidence  to  show  government  spending  can  be 
countercyclical when it is tried during crisis periods. (Singapore‘s case is most obvious 
during the global financial crisis, while Thailand‘s also includes the Asian financial crisis 
period). Perhaps the difference in potency is due to the relatively closed Thai economy 
vis-à-vis the very open Singaporean economy.  
 
In sum, we do find that fiscal spending can be effective at times in some countries, yet 
the evidence is by no means overwhelming and that the multiplier is less than one. In 
contrast, tax cuts do not seem to have the same effect. On the contrary, tax hikes seem 
to boost output especially during crisis periods. Perhaps these actions are interpreted as 
greater fiscal responsibility and credible efforts that boost confidence which in turn spur 
private consumption and investment. Reductions in government spending may not have 
the  same  impact  because  government  spending  is  often  viewed  as  essential  for 
development and future economic growth. Yet, because of the differences in economic 
development and fiscal strengths, these reasons cannot satisfactorily explain the results 
for both Singapore and say the Philippines together. Admittedly, this is one area where 
future  research  can  be  done  through  a  case  study  approach  looking  at  specific  tax 
measures in individual countries and examines their impact on consumption, investment 
and/or growth.  
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Table 1: Theoretical Predictions of Fiscal (Spending) Multiplier    
 
Scenario  Size of Multiplier 
Keynesian   
1.  Standard Keynesian spending multiplier  >1 
  (Tax multiplier)
*  <1 or >1 
Simple Keynesian Extensions   
2.  Accommodative monetary policy  >1 
3.  Liquidity trap (interest rate at the zero bound)   >1 
4.  Flexible exchange rates  <1 
5.  Pegged exchange rates  >1 
6.  Highly open economy  <1 
Neoclassical   
7.  Neoclassical model  <1 
Other considerations   
8.  Complete Ricardian equivalence  0 
9.  Debt/fiscal sustainability issues   <1 
10.  Financial innovations   Ambiguous 
11.  Expansionary fiscal contractions  <0 
 
 
*  The  standard  Keynesian  spending  multiplier  is  equal  to  1/(1-MPC),  where  0<MPC 
(marginal propensity to consume)<1. Hence, the spending multiplier is ≥1. On the other 
hand, the tax multiplier=-MPC/(1-MPC). Hence, it is larger than 1 if MPC>0.5, and smaller 
if MPC<0.5. 
  
Sources: Baxter and King (1993), Barro (1974), Mankiw (2000), Hemming et al. (2002), 




Table 2: Impact Fiscal Multiplier from a Tax Shock 
  Cholesky 
VAR 
Blanchard and Perotti 
SVAR with Estimated  13 a  
Blanchard and Perotti 












Malaysia  0.24  0.52
*  0.33 
Philippines  0.09  0.10  0.12 









To calculate the impact fiscal multiplier, the impact response of GDP to the tax shock is 
divided by the ratio of average net tax revenue to average GDP over the sample period. 
For Indonesia, the ratio is 0.17; Malaysia, 0.14; Philippines, 0.10; Singapore, 0.15; and 
Thailand, 0.19. 
* Indicates the impact impulse response is statistically significant from zero 
at the 5% level. 
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Table 3: Impact Fiscal Multiplier from a Spending Shock 
  Cholesky 
VAR 
Blanchard and Perotti 
SVAR with Estimated  13 a  
Blanchard and Perotti 









Malaysia  0.28  0.20  0.25 
Philippines  0.41  0.42  0.42 
Singapore  -0.17  -0.23  -0.20 
Thailand 
 
-0.35  -0.37  -0.37 
 
Note: 
To  calculate  the  impact  fiscal  multiplier,  the  impact  response  of  GDP  to  the  spending 
shock is divided by the ratio of average government consumption to average GDP over the 
sample  period.  For  Indonesia,  the  ratio  is  0.08;  Malaysia,  0.12;  Philippines,  0.11; 
Singapore, 0.10; and Thailand, 0.11. 
* Indicates the impact impulse response is statistically 




Table 4: Summary of Overall Results – Impulse Response of Output 
 
  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
Blanchard and Perotti SVAR (Impact Response) 
Tax shock 
 
+*  +  +  +  +* 
Spending 
shock 
-  +  +  -  - 
Time-Varying VAR 
       
Tax shock  Positive in the 















































Note: * refers to being statistically significant.  
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Note: The size of shock is one unit or one percentage point. The spaced lines refer to the ±  two asymptotic standard-
deviation error bands. The unit on the y-axis is in percent and, x-axis, quarter. "Shock 1" refers to the tax shock, "Shock 2", 
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Figure 6.1: Time-Varying Response of GDP to Tax Shock 
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Figure 6.2: Cumulative Response of GDP to Tax Shock 
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Note: The left and right hand columns show the cumulative response of GDP after one- and two-year respectively. The 
horizontal line in each plot refers to the average cumulative response over the sample period. The error bands are the 
95% confidence intervals. The kinked error bands and impulse responses for Malaysia are modeling discrepancies due to 
draws being very close to unit root.   
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Figure 7.2: Cumulative Response of GDP to Government Spending Shock 
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Note: The left and right hand columns show the cumulative response of GDP after one- and two-year respectively. The 
horizontal line in each plot refers to the average cumulative response over the sample period. The error bands are the 
95% confidence intervals. The kinked error bands and impulse responses for Malaysia are modeling discrepancies due to 
draws being very close to unit root.   




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The scale on the y-axis refers to the degree of 
capital account liberalization. Fully repressed (0); 
partially repressed (1); largely liberalized (2); and fully 
liberalized (3). 
 
Source: Abiad et al. (2008). 
Note: The scale on the y-axis refers to the degree of 
interest rate liberalization. Fully repressed (0); partially 
repressed (1 and 2); largely liberalized (3); and fully 
liberalized (4). 
 
Source: Abiad et al. (2008). 
  










































































































































































































































                               Source: Abbas et al. (2010).  






Data Description and Sources 
 
Sources and descriptions of variables used are shown below. The population data of all 
countries are obtained from World Bank's World Development Indicators. 
 
Country  Period  GDP and 








Table ID.A01: Gross Domestic Product: 
By Expenditure: Current Price; 
Table ID.A02: Gross Domestic Product: 
By Expenditure: 2000  
Price; and 
Table ID.A04: Gross Domestic Product: 





Table ID.F05: Central Government 
Operations: Total Revenue                                      
(M1:2000-M12:2009). 
 
Note: Data prior to 2001 were sourced from 
Jha et al. (2010). Using a temporal 
disaggregation method, the authors 
converted the annual data to quarterly 
based on the quarterly government 
consumption available from national 






Table MY.A01: 2000 Base: GDP  
By Expenditure: Current Price; 
Table MY.A03: 2000 Base: GDP  
by Expenditure: 2000 Price; 
Table MY.A13: 1987 Base: GDP  
By Expenditure: Current Price;  
and 
Table MY.A15: 1987 Base: GDP  
by Expenditure: 1987 Price. 
 
Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Bank Negara 
Malaysia: 
Table 6.2 Federal Government Revenue 
(http://www.bnm.gov.my/files/publication/ms
b/2009/11/xls/6.2.xls);  and 




Note: Data not available on the website are 







Table PH.A01: GDP by  
Expenditure: Current Price; and 
Table PH.A02: GDP by  
Expenditure: 1985 Price. 
 
CEIC: 
Table PH.F01: National Government 





Table SG.A03: GDP by Expenditure: 
2000 Price: Chain Linked;  
Table SG.A06: GDP by Expenditure: 
1995 Price: Chain Linked; and 
Table SG.A10: GDP by Industry: SSIC 
2005: Current Price. 
 
CEIC: 






Table TH.A01: Gross Domestic Product: 
By Expenditure: Current Price; and 
Table TH.A03: Gross Domestic Product: 
By Expenditure: 1988 Price. 
CEIC: 
Table TH.F01: Government Revenue: 
Ministry of Finance. 
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